Search results for "Collective intentionality"
showing 8 items of 8 documents
Intenzionalità collettiva, ontologia sociale e mindreading
2014
In his Collective Intentions and Actions John Searle argued that having a preintentional sense of others as at least potentially cooperative agents “like me” is a necessary condition of collective intentionality. He also argued, in Rationality in Action, that understanding others qua intentional agents necessarily presupposes rationality because rational constraints are built into the logical structure of intentional phenomena. In this paper we will try to specify further these claims in the light of current debate on mindreading, where other-understanding is spelled out either in terms of automatic, subpersonal simulative mechanisms, or in terms of normative, rational principles. We will a…
Collective Intentionality, Language, and Normativity: A Problem and a Possible Solution for the Analysis of Cooperation
2015
In this paper I discuss Searle's analysis of social ontology in the light of his account of the sources of normativity as rooted in the logical structure of language. I conclude that, though his theory of normativity may appear to be inconsistent with his theory collective intentionality, it is really our Background sense of the other that creates a sense of community even before the actual functioning of collective intentionality and language, thereby escaping the dilemma between individualism and collectivism.
Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others
2013
This paper approaches questions of collective intentionality by drawing inspiration from theories of recognition. After making some remarks about “recognition” and “groups” the paper examines whether the kind of dependence on recognition that holds of individual agents is equally true of group agents. In the debates on collective intentionality it is often stressed that the identity, existence, ethos, and membership-issues of the group are up to the group to decide. The members collectively accept (recognize) status functions, goals and beliefs for the group. This paper asks whether this thesis of “forgroupness” should be re-evaluated: could the status functions, goals and beliefs be in som…
The Role of Searle's Constitutive Rules for the Rational Criticizability of Institutional Reality
2013
My hypothesis is that we can derive the normative conditions that institutions and institutional acts have to meet in order to be rationally acceptable/recognizable from the logical structure of institutional reality. Developing Searle's achievements on the constitutive role of speech acts in the construction of institutional reality and on their character of institutional acts, I'll show that the same types of constitutive rules underlying illocutionary acts also underlie institutional reality. I’ll then argue that we can derive a specific set of normative criteria for the rational criticizability of institutional acts from these constitutive rules in the same way that we can derive normat…
Social Ontology, Collective Intentionality, and Mindreading
2013
Standard accounts of social reality take collective intentionality as the starting point of the creation and maintenance of social facts. But collective intentionality is enabled, as Searle suggests, by a more basic capacity to understand another person as an agent like oneself and as ready to engage in cooperative activities. We can coordinate our collective actions only insofar we are able to explain and predict the behavior of other persons, we can understand behavior only insofar we can mindread them, and we can mindread them only if we assume the constitutive role of rationality in action. Therefore …
Intenzionalità collettiva versus plural subject nel confronto tra Searle e Gilbert: influssi hobbesiani e rousseauiani nel dibattito contemporaneo su…
2019
At which conditions are we allowed to take a plurality of individuals as a collective or a social group? In this paper I address that question by considering the relationship between individuals and collectivity under the respect of the process by which the collectivity is being formed. I will take into account Margaret Gilbert’s theory of joint commitment and plural subject and John Searle’s theory of collective intentionality. In particular I will discuss their view on the phrase «individuals as a group», which bears an intrinsic tension between the individuals, treated as manifold and plural entities, and the group, treated as one singular entity. These theories do hold in common the att…
Sources and Boundaries of Institutional and Linguistic Normativity. Towards a Critical Social Ontology.
2013
Since Hegel and until speech acts theory and contemporary social ontology it came to full development the idea that most of reasons, duties, rights, entitlements, have to do, against Kant, with our participation to social, linguistic and institutional practices of the lifeform to which we belong rather than or more than with our dealing with “substantive moral principles”. But if we accept, with Hegel, that every individual rational determination of the will is justified as such only as a part of our collective Sittlichkheit (Hegel, 1967, cf. Di Lorenzo Ajello, 2009); if we accept from speech acts theory that there are commitments, rights and entitlements specific to every type of speech ac…
ENSO IV - Book of Abstracts
2015
The conference addresses questions about the formation, persistence, change and collapse of social-institutional reality; the nature of collective intentionality; the ontogenesis of the capacity for interaction; team reasoning and distributed cognition; collective decision-making; collective responsibility; political power and social change; the role of language in the construction of social and institutional reality; institutional and social normativity; group membership and group identity; the logical and normative structure of cooperation; the psychological and conceptual mechanisms underlying the emergence of social interaction and collective agency; the nature of duties and rights buil…